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Expert Testimony and the Epistemology of
Disagreement
Alex Stein*
Before I begin, I would like to thank Michael Risinger and the Seton
Hall Law Review for the opportunity to present my Comment at this
wonderful symposium. Under the taxonomy used in my favorite sport—
soccer—this opportunity is a hat-trick: it makes me feel blessed, honored,
and lucky. I feel blessed because this symposium is a rare occasion that pays
tribute to a truly remarkable evidence scholar, Michael Risinger, whose
writings have advanced the understanding of the discipline as a socially
important subset of applied epistemology.1 I feel honored because I am
about to comment on the work of another distinguished and exceptionally
prolific scholar of evidence, Ed Imwinkelried.2 I feel lucky because the work
I am going to comment on intersects with my current interest in the
epistemology of disagreement.3
***
Professor Imwinkelried ties post-conviction relief to discreditation of a
forensic expert’s testimony that helped the prosecution prove the defendant’s
guilt. Specifically, he argues that “an accused ought to be entitled to a new
trial when: (1) the accused presents testimony about a new analytic technique
developed in subsequent scientific research; (2) that technique yields a
different outcome than the expert technique used at the prior trial; and (3)
the validation of the new technique is so extensive that it either discredits the

*Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I thank Michel Risinger and Gideon
Parchomovsky for their comments on an earlier draft.
1
For contributions that influenced my thinking about evidence law and epistemology,
see D. Michael Risinger, The Irrelevance, and Central Relevance, of the Boundary Between
Science and Non-Science in the Evaluation of Expert Witness Reliability, 52 VILL. L. REV.
679 (2007); D. Michael Risinger, et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects
in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1
(2002) (explaining how subjective human judgment enters into forensic findings and how to
block this influence).
2
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Debunked, Discredited, but Still Defended Revising State
Post-Conviction Relief Statutes to Cover Convictions Resting on Subsequently Invalidated
Expert Testimony, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1095 (2018).
3
See generally Alex Stein, Law and the Epistemology of Disagreement, 96 WASH. U.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3070697.
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prior expert testimony or seriously undermines confidence in its
correctness.”4 From a normative standpoint, granting that “beyond a
reasonable doubt” is a right standard for findings of guilt,5 this argument is
undeniably correct. Professor Imwinkelried also discusses more difficult
cases in which “new scientific evidence creates grave doubts about the
accuracy of the prior conviction but falls short of demonstrating the
accused’s undeniable innocence.”6 According to him, in these cases “the
courts and legislatures have a far more difficult policy choice; they must
weigh the competing interests in accuracy and finality.”7 These cases are
hard because the new science does not “shake our confidence in the
conviction”8 and whether it should “trump the substantial public interest in
finality of judgment”9 is unclear.
In this Article, I will try to shed some light on these hard cases.
I
The paradigmatic hard-case scenario involves two forensic experts:
Expert G, whose testimony suggests that the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, and Expert I, who testifies that the defendant might be
innocent. Expert G testifies as a prosecution witness at the defendant’s trial
to secure the defendant’s conviction. Expert I testifies at the defendant’s
post-conviction hearing (or submits an affidavit in support of the defendant’s
petition for post-conviction relief). Such cases are considered hard for the
“floodgate” type of reason. Allowing Expert I to reopen the defendant’s
conviction and force out a retrial would make post-conviction relief available
to all similarly situated defendants. Many defendants would be able to find
Expert I whose testimony would cast doubt on the forensic analysis of Expert
G and obtain post-conviction relief. This will undercut the social interest in
the finality of guilty verdicts.
This argument is facially appealing, but I believe that it is
fundamentally flawed. Similarly to many other allusions to a floodgate, it
4

Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1136.
For criticism of this conventional standard, see LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND
CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 29, 63 (2006) (arguing that the “beyond
a reasonable doubt” standard allows for too many erroneous acquittals that may lead to
socially devastating consequences); Larry Laudan, Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?, 9
LEGAL THEORY 295 (2003) (arguing that the proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement is
dysfunctional); Larry Laudan, Is it Finally Time to Put ‘Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt’
Out to Pasture? (Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Series No. 194, 2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1815321 (criticizing the wrongful conviction versus wrongful
acquittal tradeoff contemplated by the “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard).
6
Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1136.
7
Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1137.
8
Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1137.
9
Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1137.
5
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does not only make the floodgate prediction, but also identifies the gate that
needs to be locked to prevent the floodgate. Additionally, the argument
makes a convoluted assumption that the floodgate problem cannot be
prevented by closing a different gate ahead of time.10 As I will show, this
tacit and consequently unexamined assumption turns out to be false. Cases
identified by Professor Imwinkelried as hard are the consequence of the
Daubert rule that allows factfinders to base a defendant’s conviction on
defeasible forensic testimony.11 Most of those cases could be eliminated if
our system were to follow the rigid Frye standard that renders inadmissible
expert testimony not fully supported by scientific consensus.12 By the “rigid
Frye standard,” I mean the requirement that a forensic expert’s methodology
and its application to the facts of the individual case follow scientific
procedures that received an enduring and widespread recognition in the
expert’s professional community.13
My prior work supported this standard on moral grounds: I argued that
Frye is the only rule that aligns with what I called the “equal best”
10

This logical flaw is present in many, of not all, theories that allude to “floodgates” and
“slippery slopes.” See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1026, 1030–31 (2003) (demonstrating that the validity of “slippery slope” claims
critically depends on the comparison between all available ways of preventing the feared bad
consequence). Cf. David Enoch, Once You Start Using Slippery Slope Arguments, You’re on
a Very Slippery Slope, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 629 (2001) (arguing that “slippery slope”
arguments are self-defeating because decision-makers who fear that Decision A, otherwise
preferable to alternatives, will increase their probability of making wrong distinctions down
the road, should be equally skeptical about their current ability to distinguish between valid
and invalid “slippery slope” claims; and so by failing to make Decision A and act upon it, they
will put themselves on yet another, equally damaging, slippery slope).
11
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
12
See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also 1 Charles
Tilford McCormick et al., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 827, § 203 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th
ed. 2006) (explaining that the Frye standard requires the proponent of an expert’s testimony
to “show that the scientific community agrees that the principles or techniques on which the
expert relies are capable of producing accurate information and conclusions.”). Under this
standard, expert testimony not aligning with conventional wisdom is not admissible. See id.
at 828 (giving examples of novel scientific findings that “have fallen prey to [Frye’s]
influence”).
13
For illustrations of the strict version of Frye, see Overton v. State, 976 So. 2d 536, 550
(Fla. 2007) (“In utilizing the Frye test, the burden is on the proponent of the evidence to prove
the general acceptance of both the underlying scientific principle and the testing procedures
used to apply that principle to the facts of the case at hand.” (quoting Ramirez v. State, 651
So. 2d 1164, 1168 (Fla. 1995))); Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 857 N.E.2d 1114, 1119–20 (N.Y.
2006) (“[T]he Frye test asks ‘whether the accepted techniques, when properly performed,
generate results accepted as reliable within the scientific community generally.’” (citation
omitted) (quoting People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454 (N.Y. 1994))); State v. Gregory,
147 P.3d 1201, 1238 (Wash. 2006) (“Washington has adopted the Frye test for evaluating the
admissibility of new scientific evidence. . . . Both the scientific theory underlying the
evidence and the technique or methodology used to implement it must be generally accepted
in the scientific community for evidence to be admissible under Frye.” (citing State v. Gore,
21 P.3d 262, 271–72 (Wash. 2001))).
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requirement for allocating the risk of wrongful conviction.14 This
requirement mandates that the state afford criminal defendants the best
feasible protection against erroneous conviction while keeping that
protection equal for all defendants.15 In this Article, I take a different tack.
Specifically, I rely on the epistemology of disagreement to support the claim
that defendants should be granted a retrial in cases identified by Professor
Imwinkelried as hard. As a corollary, I argue that all inculpatory forensic
evidence should satisfy the rigid Frye standard to be admissible. This
discussion introduces some refinements into Professor Imwinkelried’s
analysis of the Texas and California statutes that address the problem at
hand.16
II
The epistemology of disagreement is a rapidly developing subset of
normative epistemology.17 It focuses on disagreement among peers and its
rational effects on the underlying decision.18 Specifically, it examines two
14

ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 196–97 (2005).
Id. at 172–78. Professor Laudan, supra note 5, at 131, criticizes the “equal best”
standard for being overbroad. Specifically, he argues that the best protection against erroneous
conviction must completely eliminate an innocent defendant’s risk of being found guilty.
Under this level of protection, the legal system has no choice but to acquit each and every
defendant—a consequence that also makes the “equal” element of my proposed standard
conceptually redundant. See also Larry Laudan, The Elementary Epistemic Arithmetic of the
Law II: The Inadequate Resources of Moral Theory for Dealing with the Criminal Law *6,
n.3 (U. of Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 193, Apr. 19, 2011),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1815311 (“This principle of Stein’s seems to be redundant on its
face. If its first clause is satisfied, namely, if the state genuinely did its best to protect a
defendant from false conviction, the possibility would not arise that it gave better protection
to some other defendant since the latter situation, if it occurred, would gainsay the claim that
the state had done its best for the former defendant.”). This criticism misrepresents the “equal
best” standard. This standard does not call for a complete elimination of erroneous
convictions. Rather, it requires that the state do its practical best at protecting defendants
against erroneous conviction and that this level of protection be the same for all defendants.
Under this standard, courts would not be authorized to convict a defendant in the presence of
evidence pointing to his possible innocence until this evidence is discredited. Evidence
identifying the defendant as a perpetrator of the alleged crime, on the other hand, will suffice
for the defendant’s conviction despite any theoretical doubt unsubstantiated by the evidence.
See STEIN, supra note 14, at 173, 175. The equality requirement here serves an important goal:
it requires the legal system to set up general rules of evidence and procedure in order to
prevent unfairness to individual defendants whose protection against false convictions would
otherwise be completely dependent on the judges’ and the jurors’ discretion.
16
See Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1131–34 (discussing West’s Ann. Cal. Penal Code
§ 1473(e)(1) and Vernon’s Ann. Texas C.C.P. Art. 11.073).
17
See Richard Feldman, Reasonable Religious Disagreements, in PHILOSOPHERS
WITHOUT GODS: MEDITATIONS ON ATHEISM AND THE SECULAR LIFE 194 (Louise M. Antony,
ed. 2007) (explaining epistemological significance of disagreements).
18
See generally David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey, Introduction, in THE
EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISAGREEMENT: NEW ESSAYS 1, 1–3 (David Christensen & Jennifer
15
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big questions. First, should a person revise her decision after learning that a
similarly situated decision-maker—an “epistemic peer”— disagrees with it?
Second, and relatedly, does the fact that an equally informed and competent
decision-maker disagrees with the person’s decision reduce the decision’s
reliability?19
Consider two friends, Georgina and Ian, who agree to have lunch
together and split the check. At the end of the meal, the waiter brings the
check to the table. Georgina and Ian examine the check that subsequently
disappears from the table. Asking the waiter to bring a new check is against
social etiquette. Based on what she saw on the check, Georgina calculates
that she and Ian must pay $26 each for the meal. She tells Ian about it, but
Ian informs her that, based on his recollection, each must pay $30. Can
Georgina justifiably refuse to modify her decision?20
Arguably, Georgina cannot justifiably refuse to do so.21 She and Ian
were exposed to the same objective information about the cost of the meal.
Presumably, Ian’s memory and capacity to make simple algebraic
calculations are not inferior to Georgina’s. All this makes Ian Georgina’s
epistemic peer.22 Ian’s disagreement with Georgina consequently constitutes
evidence that requires Georgina to revise her belief. Since she and Ian were
equally likely to miscalculate the amount to be paid, each of them should
leave $28 on the table.23 At a minimum, Ian’s disagreement with Georgina
should make her less confident about her original belief.24
The fact that a person’s epistemic peer disagrees with her decision is
best conceptualized as second-order evidence.25 Second-order evidence is a
broad category: it includes any information pertaining to the reliability of the
primary, first-order, evidence that supports the person’s factual findings.
From this perspective, Ian’s disagreement with Georgina constitutes secondLackey, eds., 2013) (outlining issues focused upon by epistemologists of disagreement). For
excellent surveys of the literature, see Jonathan Matheson, Disagreement and Epistemic
Peers, in OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE: SCHOLARLY RESEARCH REVIEWS (2015),
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.001.0001/oxfor
dhb-9780199935314-e-13?rskey=yxQfUL&result=1; David Christensen, Disagreement as
Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy, 4 PHIL. COMPASS 756 (2009).
19
See supra notes 17–25 and sources cited therein.
20
This example draws on David Christensen, Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good
News, 116 PHIL. REV. 187, 193–94 (2007).
21
See Christensen & Lackey, supra note 18, at 2.
22
See Matheson, supra note 18, at 2–3.
23
This adjustment follows the “equal weight” principle for resolving peer disagreements.
See Adam Elga, Reflection and Disagreement, 41 NOÛS 478, 484–90 (2007).
24
See Christensen, supra note 20, at 193.
25
See Richard Feldman, Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement, 6
EPISTEME 294, 295 (2009) (“[E]vidence of peer disagreement is False higher-order
evidence—evidence about the significance of one’s first-order evidence.”); Matheson, supra
note 18, at 5–6.
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order evidence that reduces the reliability of Georgina’s factual finding about
the requisite payment. It indicates that Georgina may have miscalculated the
payment or, alternatively, missed something when she looked at the check.
Hence, if Georgina is interested in making an epistemically justified
decision, she ought to account for these possibilities and update her initial
view accordingly. From an epistemological standpoint, not doing so would
be unjustified, if not altogether irrational. If Georgina could justifiably
ignore Ian’s calculation, then Ian, too, could justifiably stick to his guns after
hearing from Georgina that each side should pay the restaurant $26, as
opposed to $30. Consequently, both Ian’s and Georgina’s decisions would
be deemed justified, which is patently absurd. One of those decisions, if not
both of them, must be wrong.
There is no consensus among epistemologists as to how a peer’s
disagreement with a person’s decision should affect that decision. Some
epistemologists take a non-conciliatory, or steadfast, approach to peer
disagreements.26 Under this approach, a peer’s disagreement with a person’s
rational belief does not require the person to revise that belief.27 Other
epistemologists adopt a conciliatory approach to peer disagreements,28 under
which a peer’s disagreement ought to be accounted for as second-order
evidence that reduces the person’s level of confidence in her own belief.29
Facing a peer’s dissent, the person must assume that her belief or decision
may have some flaws that she failed to notice. This assumption makes the
person’s belief or decision less dependable than it would have been if it faced
no dissenters.
The steadfast approach is particularly appropriate for cases in which a
person can rationally claim to have an unshakable, or categorical, belief that
comes close to what epistemologists identify as “knowledge.”30 Holders of
such beliefs need no second-order evidence that could tell them how reliable
those beliefs are. The reason is obvious: those beliefs are reliable. Secondorder evidence that confirms a person’s justified categorical belief gives the
person no useful information; and so it is redundant. And when second-order
26
See, e.g., Thomas Kelly, The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement, in OXFORD
STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY 167 (John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler, eds., 2005) (arguing for
the steadfast approach).
27
See, e.g., Ralph Wedgwood, The Moral Evil Demons, in DISAGREEMENT 216, 228
(Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield, eds., 2010).
28
See Elga, supra note 23; Feldman, supra note 17; Feldman, supra note 25; Christensen,
supra note 18; Christensen, supra note 20; Matheson, supra note 18.
29
See Feldman, supra note 25, at 295; Matheson, supra note 18, at 5–6; Stein, supra note
3.
30
See generally ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION 3 (1986)
(“Epistemologists have traditionally been interested in whether beliefs about the world are
justified or warranted; whether we are rationally entitled to these beliefs. Epistemologists seek
to discover or invent proper methods of inquiry and investigation. . .”).
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evidence (say, an epistemic peer’s disagreement) indicates that the person’s
justified categorical belief might be false, this indication is not credible and
the person will consequently do well to ignore it.
To see why, consider again the restaurant example, but assume this time
that Georgina is absolutely confident that the check amount and the
customary gratuity total $52, which means that she and Ian should pay $26
each. Under this assumption, Georgina should disregard Ian’s dissent
because she knows that Ian is wrong. Before rejecting Ian’s dissent,
however, Georgina will do well to verify that her memorized observation
and calculation could not somehow go wrong. For example, if some of her
past memorized observations or simple mathematical calculations turned out
to be false, she could not justifiably hold a categorical belief that she and Ian
should pay the waiter $52. However, if her observations and memory never
failed her in the past and her calculations were always accurate as well,
Georgina would have enough rational grounds to assume that her current
observation memory and calculation are accurate as well.31 Georgina’s view
that she and Ian must pay the waiter $26 each would then come close to what
epistemologists call a “justified true belief.”32
Assume now that Georgina forms a defeasible belief that she and Ian
must pay the waiter $52. That is, Georgina is fairly confident about the
amount she and Ian should pay, but she is also aware of the possibility that
she misperceived or forgot the check amount, or miscalculated the gratuity.
Under this scenario, it would be epistemically unjustified, if not downright
irrational, for Georgina to take the steadfast approach as it might lead her to
a wrong decision.33 Holders of defeasible beliefs, therefore, should account
for second-order evidence indicating how reliable their beliefs are.34
III
These epistemological insights have profound implications for expert
testimony. Forensic experts testifying in criminal trials are epistemic peers
who base their testimony on roughly (if not completely) the same
information. Consequently, one expert’s testimony should generally count
as second-order evidence for another expert.
When Expert G and Expert I disagree with each other, each expert must

31

See Stein, supra note 3.
See Stein, supra note 3.
33
Cf. David Enoch, Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but not Too
Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement, 119 MIND 953, 994 (2010) (arguing that a person’s
rational choice between the steadfast and conciliatory approaches depends, inter alia, on
“other things [the person justifiably] believe[s], on other evidence [she has] [and] on the
epistemic methods [she is] justified in employing . . .”).
34
See Stein, supra note 3.
32

STEIN (DO NOT DELETE)

1206

8/8/2018 2:25 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1199

clarify to the court whether her findings are categorical or defeasible. If the
expert claims her findings to be categorical, she must state the reasons for
making that assessment. These reasons must be strong enough to make the
expert’s findings a justified true belief. Under these conditions, the expert’s
findings will need no validation by second-order evidence and the expert can
justifiably disregard the testimony of her dissenter.
Consider an expert who calculates the chances of finding a random
DNA match between blood recovered from a crime scene and the
defendant’s blood sample according to the protocols accepted by DNA
experts worldwide. The expert’s testimony is accurate for all practical
purposes.35 But it faces a dissenter who challenges the accepted DNA match
calculation. Under such circumstances, the expert need not heed the view of
the dissenter who runs afoul of the accepted wisdom. Contrariwise, it is the
dissenter who should consider the accepted wisdom and the expert’s
testimony as second-order evidence undermining the reliability of his
findings.
Think now of a forensic expert witness whose findings are defeasible.
Those findings are about traces, fingerprints, bite marks or other matters over
which experts may legitimately disagree.36 The expert faces a dissenter who
disagrees with those findings. In this case, the dissent should count as
second-order evidence that must prompt the expert to reduce her level of
confidence in her findings. The expert would be epistemically wrong not to
heed the dissent. When an expert witness disregards the dissent, the court
should tell the jury that there is a reason to discount the expert’s credibility.
On similar grounds, a convicted defendant should become eligible for
post-conviction relief when a previously unavailable expert witness
identifies flaws in the defeasible forensic testimony that the prosecution used
to secure his conviction.37 Any such defendant should be entitled to a new
trial, if not to an acquittal. Not granting relief will lead to wrongful
convictions of innocent defendants.
Using experts’ disagreement as a reason for granting post-conviction
relief for defendants may seem extreme, but it is not. The root problem here
is not the broad availability of the post-conviction relief, but the wide-open

35

See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES 668
(2002) (noting the existence of scientific consensus about reliability of DNA evidence that
satisfies conventional protocols).
36
See id. at 69–78; 210–19; 271–72 (describing controversies surrounding trace,
fingerprint and bite mark evidence).
37
If the after-discovered expert evidence was discoverable at the time of the defendant’s
trial, the defendant will do well to attack his conviction by invoking “the well-settled doctrine
of ineffective assistance of counsel and cite favorable, recent precedents such as Hinton”.
Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1104–05 (citing Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014)).
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admissibility rule—the discretionary Daubert standard38—that allows the
prosecution to rely on defeasible forensic findings. To fix this problem, the
legal system must do away with Daubert and reinstate, for all criminal cases,
the strict version of Frye39—a rue that requires inculpatory expert testimony
to fully align with scientific consensus as a firm prerequisite for
admissibility.40
With this in mind, I now offer some thoughts about Professor
Imwinkelried’s analysis of the California and Texas post-conviction
statutes.41 Circumstances under which the California statute grants a
convicted defendant post-conviction relief include a case in which “[f]alse
evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or
punishment was introduced against a person at a hearing or trial relating to
his or her incarceration.”42 For purposes of this provision, “‘false evidence’
includes opinions of experts. . .that have been undermined by later scientific
research or technological advances.”43 This provision squarely aligns with
California’s adoption of the Frye standard for admissibility of scientific
evidence.44 When “later scientific research or technological advances”
undermine forensic evidence that secured the defendant’s conviction, this
evidence no longer enjoys standing recognition by the scientific community
and thus, no longer satisfies the Frye standard. Instead, it becomes
defeasible. In tune with the epistemological principles outlined in this
Article, another expert’s disagreement with that evidence raises a reasonable
doubt about the defendant’s guilt.45 Under such circumstances, the
defendant has a rightful demand for a retrial, as also suggested by Professor
Imwinkelried for reasons unrelated to Frye.46
38

See supra note 11.
See supra note 12.
40
Whether criminal defendants should be permitted to use exculpatory expert testimony
that satisfies Daubert or an even lower standard in trying to raise a reasonable doubt about
their guilt is a separate question. I believe defendants have this entitlement under the Sixth
Amendment Compulsory Process Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See Alex Stein, Inefficient
Evidence, 66 ALA. L. REV. 423, 460-69 (2015).
41
See Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1131–34 (discussing Cal. Penal Code § 1473(e)(1)
and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 11.073).
42
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(b)(1) (West 2017).
43
Id. § 1473(e)(1).
44
See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976) (adopting Frye’s general
acceptance standard in California law); People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 324–31 (Cal. 1994)
(reaffirming applicability of Kelly-Frye doctrine in California courts and declining to switch
to Daubert).
45
See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text.
46
Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1100. The California statute also provides that the
prosecution expert’s repudiation of her own testimony makes the defendant entitled to a new
trial. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(e)(1). Professor Imwinkelried criticizes that provision for
being “too liberal” because a witness’s “recantation of prior testimony is not a ground for
39
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Under the Texas statute, a convicted defendant can successfully apply
for post-conviction relief when new expert research “contradicts scientific
evidence relied on by the state at trial.”47 Unlike California courts, Texas
courts follow the Daubert standard in admitting scientific evidence.48 This
standard makes defeasible forensic testimony admissible for both
inculpatory and exculpatory purposes.49 Under the epistemology of
disagreement principles, when defeasible forensic testimony is contradicted
by another expert equally informed of the relevant facts, its probative value
is diminished.50 This disagreement is sufficient in and of itself for raising a
reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt.
Professor Imwinkelried views the “contradiction” requirement as “too
restrictive.”51 According to him, “‘Contradict’ would probably subsume
situations in which the later research altogether discredits the earlier
testimony.”52 In my opinion, this restrictive interpretation is unlikely to be
adopted by Texas courts. These courts seem to prefer the ordinary meaning
of “contradict” that refers to another witness’s express or implicit denial of
the “contradicted” testimony.53 There is no requirement for full disproof.
Both California and Texas post-conviction statutes thus fully align with
sound epistemological principles. I agree with Professor Imwinkelried’s
assessment of the California system of science-driven post-conviction relief
as superior to the Texas system, but my reasons are different from his. The
California system is better than Texas’s not because it gives convicted
defendants better post-trial opportunity to attack questionable forensics.
This system is superior because it disqualifies questionable forensics at the
trial itself pursuant to the Frye-Kelly doctrine.54

postconviction relief” in most courts across the United States. Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at
1133.
47
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.073(a)(2) (West 2015).
48
See E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995)
(adopting and expanding the Daubert standard); Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 553-54
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (noting that admissibility of scientific evidence in Texas criminal
courts is governed by the Kelly standard similar to Daubert (citing Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d
568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).
49
See Jordan, 928 S.W.2d at 555 (noting that under the Kelly-Daubert multifactor test,
expert testimony only needs to have a “basis in sound scientific methodology” to be
admissible).
50
See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text.
51
Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1132.
52
Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 1132.
53
See, e.g., Hudson v. State, 112 S.W.3d 794, 801 (Tex. App. 2003).
54
See supra note 44 and cases cited therein.

